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Direct Payments of State Scholarship Funds to ChurchRelated Colleges Offend the Constitution and Title VI*
Roy Whitehead, Jr.** & Walter Block***

I. INTRODUCTION

The State of Arkansas provides a full academic scholarship to a state
approved public or private Arkansas institution of higher education to
graduates of Arkansas secondary schools who have demonstrated "superior academic ability." 1 The sole measure of the graduate's "extraordinary academic ability" is demonstrated by scoring "32 or above on
the American College Test (ACT), 1410 or above on Scholastic Aptitude
Test (SAT) or selection as a finalist in the National Merit Scholarship
Competition." 2 The purpose of the Governor's Distinguished Scholars
Program, according to the enabling legislation, is "that outstanding students are an essential ingredient for the economic and social benefit of
the State of Arkansas. Benefits accrue to the state when a majority of National Merit Scholars and superior students attend Arkansas institutions
of higher learning and remain in the state." 3
The Arkansas Governor's Distinguished Scholars program awards
scholarships in amounts equal to the tuition, room and board, and mandatory fees charged a student for a regular full-time course load by the approved institution of higher education in which the student is enrolled. 4
There are nine public and six private, church-related, approved institutions participating in the program. 5 The dollar value of the scholarship
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I. ARK. CODE ANN.§ 6-82-306(b)(4) (Michie 1998).
2. Doug Smith, Pushinf? and Shoving For the State's Top Scholars, ARKANSAS TIMES, Aug
27, 1999 at 13.
3. ARK. CODE ANN.§ 6-82-301 (Michie 1998).
4. See ARK. CODE ANN.§ 6-82-312(b) (West, WESTLAW through 1999 Sess.).
5. See ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF HIGHER EDUCATION, Student Enrollments Fall 1998,
tbl. Ill, State Appropriations Per Student for Arkansas Governor's Distinguished Scholars for the
1999-2000 Fiscal Year (May 1999).
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award varies considerably between public and private institutions. For
example, a Distinguished Scholar recipient enrolled in Hendrix, a private
church-related institution, costs the State about $15,474 per year. 6 In contrast, a Distinguished Scholar enrolled at Southern Arkansas University,
a public institution, will cost the State about $5,088 per year. 7
It is critical to understand that the State disperses the scholarship
funds directly to either the approved public or the approved private,
church-related institutions. 8 The State sends no funds directly to the parents or the Distinguished Scholar recipients. 9 The responsibility for selecting the scholarship recipients rests with the Director of the Arkansas
Department of Higher Education. 10 In order to keep the scholarships, the
Distinguished Scholars must pass at least 24 credit hours while maintaining a 3.25 cumulative grade-point average on a 4.0 scale per academic
II
year.
As a condition of participation in the program, each institution of
higher education, public or church-related, must agree to provide the
State with administrative services in administering the program. Key
among these services is the appointment of an institution representative
to act as administrator of the program for that campus. 12 This administrator is to receive all disbursements, complete all forms and rosters, verify
all data, and insure compliance with all Department of Higher Education
(DHE) program rules and regulations. 13 In addition, the institution, public or private, must maintain disbursement records, prepare an annual Institutional Financial Information Sheet for all programs administered by
DHE, prepare a list of program drops outs, certify full-time enrollment,
provide DHE with an institutional verification of compliance at least
twice yearly, and finally, from time to time, submit to a DHE review of
the institution's records to demonstrate its due diligence as a steward of
14
state funds.
The program has been popular with good students. The State
awarded a total of 936 Distinguished Governor's Scholarships for the
1997-98, 1998-99, and 1999-2000 academic years. 15 Of those, 425
6. See id.
7. See id.
8. See ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF HIGHER EDUCATION, ARKANSAS GOVERNOR'S
SCHOLARS PROGRAM RULES AND PROCEDURES, Rule 5 (1999) [hereinafter DHE].
9. See id.
I 0. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 6-82-304 (3) (Michie 1998).
II. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 6-82-311 (c) (Michie 1998).
12. DHE RULES AND PROCEDURES, Rule 5.
13. See id.
14. !d.
15. ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF HIGHER EDUCATION, supra n.5, tbl. I. Comparison of the
Number of Arkansas Governor's Distinguished Scholarship Awards by Institution for the 1997-98

191]

DIRECT SCHOLARSHIP PAYMENTS

193

(52.6%) chose to attend a public institution, and 383 (47.4%) chose to
16
attend a private, church-related institution. The approximate expenditure of state funds for the scholarship program has resulted in disbursements of $6, 149,087 to private, church-related, institutions and
$3,666,371 to their public counterparts. 17 As a result, 62.6% of the total
state distinguished scholarship funds were forwarded directly to the for18
mer and 37.4% to the latter. Of interest is the ethnic breakdown of the
scholarship recipients: Four (0.4%) African American; nineteen (2.0%)
Asian; five (0.5%) Native American; 885 (94.6%) Caucasian; three
(0.3%) Hispanic, and twenty (2.1%) other or unknown. Finally, 532
(56.8%) of the scholars were male, and 404 (43.2%) female. 19
This article discusses the Governor's Distinguished Scholar Scholarship Program which was designed to entice Arkansas' best and brightest
students to attend Arkansas public and private institutions of higher education. While perhaps well-intentioned, the program suffers from several
fatal constitutional infirmities. We first discuss the Distinguished Scholars scholarship program as it relates to the Establishment Clause of the
First Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment of the Constitution. We then examine the program as it relates to Title VI of the Civil Rights Act and conclude that it has an unwholesome, disparate impact on African-American students. The article
concludes with a few modest proposals to cure the infirmities of the
scholarship program by achieving the intent of the program without offending the Constitution or Title VI.
II. THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution states that
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of [a] religion,
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof." 20 It is settled that "[t]he Fourteenth Amendment has rendered the legislatures of the states as incompetent as the Congress to enact such laws." 21 Consequently, the Arkansas
General Assembly is constitutionally prohibited from enacting laws respecting an establishment of a religion. But what type of state action offends the Establishment Clause? Does the Governor's Distinguished

Through 1999-00 Academic Years.
16. See id.
17. See ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF HIGHER EDUCATION, supra n.5, tbl. II, Amount of Arkansas Governor's Distinguished Scholarship Awards by Institution.
18. See id.
19. See DHE supra note 12.
20. U.S. CONST. amend I.
21 Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296,303 (1940).
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Scholars Scholarship Program, which provides for the direct payment of
state funds to private, church-related institutions of higher education, offend the prohibitions of the First Amendment? The answer lies in the intent of the Founding Fathers and relevant case law in distributing public
monies directly to church organizations and church-related institutions.

A. Intent
Thomas Jefferson's famous letter about separation of church and
state to the Danbury Baptist Association is often cited as the primary authority regarding the intent of the Establishment Clause. However, two
James Madison veto messages and a letter to the Baptist Churches of
Neal's Creek and Black Creek, North Carolina, arguably are more
revealing of the intent of these writers of the Constitution and the First
Amendment. While Jefferson's letter reflected his concern over the establishment of a state religion, Madison's veto messages and his letter
dealt with situations like the Arkansas scholarship program. This further
reveals his notion that religious societies should remain pure, or rather,
separated from government influence.
In 1811, Congress passed a bill giving certain powers to an Episcopal Church in Virginia. 22 Among the powers granted was the authority to
provide for the support of the poor and the education of poor children. 23
On February II, 1811, President Madison returned the bill to Congress
with a veto message, arguing that the government had no authority over
the affairs of the church because of the Establishment Clause. He said the
bill violated the Constitution because it "would be a precedent for giving
religious societies, as such, a legal agency in carrying into effect a legal
and public duty." 24 Later that same month, Madison vetoed another bill
that, in part, reserved a parcel of government land in the Mississippi Territory for the Baptist Church at Salem Meeting House. He maintained
that the bill violated the principle of the Establishment Clause prohibiting
the use of government money to support religious societies. 25
Shortly thereafter Madison received a letter from two Baptist
churches in North Carolina approving his veto of the Bill to provide support to the Mississippi Baptist Church. 26 In his response Madison wrote:
22. THE DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES WITH AN
APPENDIX CONTAINING IMPORTANT STATE PAPERS AND THE PUBLIC DOCUMENTS, AND ALL THE
LAWS OF A PUBLIC NATURE; WITH A COPIOUS INDEX. ELEVENTH CONGRESS - THIRD SESSION.
COMPRISING THE PERIOD FROM DECEMBER 3, 1810 TO MARCH 3, 1811, INCLUSIVE. 982- 85.
(Washington: Gales and Seaton 1853).
23.

See id.

24. !d.
25.

/d.

26. !d.
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"having regarded the practical distinction between Religion and Civil
Government as essential to the purity of both and as guaranteed by the
Constitution of the United States, I could not have otherwise discharged
27
my duty .... " It is clear that Madison believed that government possesses no authority to impose a duty or responsibility on a religious
28
body. Nor, as evidenced in the matter of the Baptist Church at Salem
Meeting House, does the government have the authority to use its funds
to directly support a religious society. Madison believed that the Constitution granted the government no power over religion. Religion was to be
shielded from government influence, and the best way to separate church
and state was to forbid the government from imposing any responsibilities or duties on religious societies. To maintain this purity, government
was given no Constitutional authority or cause to directly support religious societies. This attitude arose not from hostility to religion but from
a desire to protect it from the heavy hand of government regulation.
Knowing that government regulation follows government funds, the
most prudent approach to safeguard religious purity was to prevent government from distributing public funds directly to private religious organizations.

B. Case Law
The United States Supreme Court has had occasion to deal with the
issue of direct government aid and subsequent regulation of church29
related organizations. In Lemon v. Kurtzman, the Supreme Court announced a three-prong test to determine whether the Establishment
Clause has been violated. According to Lemon, a statute does not violate
the Establishment Clause when (1) it has a secular legislative purpose,
27. To be supplied.
28. As James Madison noted in the following letter:
June 3, 1811. To the Baptist Churches in Neal's Creek and on Black Creek, North Carolina. I have received, fellow-citizens, your address, approving my objection to tile (sic)
Bill containing a grant of public land to the, Baptist Church at Salem Meeting House:
Mississippi Territory. Having always regarded tile (sic) practical distinction between Religion and Civil Government as essential to the purity of both and as guaranteed by the
Constitution of the United States. I could not have otherwise discharged my duty on the
occasion which presented itself. Among the various religious societies in our Country,
none has been more vigilant or constant in maintaining that distinction than the Society of
which you make a part, and it is an honorable proof of your sincerity and integrity, that
you are as ready to do so in a case favoring the interest of your brethren as in other cases.
It is but dust, at the same time, to the Baptist Church at Salem Meeting House, to remark
that their application to the National legislature does not appear to have contemplated a
grant to the land in question but on terms that might be equitable to the public as well as
to themselves. Accept my friendly respects. James Madison.
LEITERS AND OTHER WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON, FOURTH PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES,
IN FOUR VOLUMES, Vol. II 511-12 (Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott & Co. 1865).
29. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
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(2) its primary effect neither advances or inhibits religion, and (3) it does
30
not excessively entangle government with religion. In Lemon the Court
considered a Pennsylvania state statute that authorized the state to purchase secular educational services from private schools and directly reimburse those schools only for teacher's salaries, textbooks, and other
31
types of instructional materials. Most of the schools were affiliated with
32
the Roman Catholic Church. These schools were subject to state audit
and had to "identify the separate cost of the secular educational service"
33
to receive reimbursement.
The Court decided that the state statute violated the Establishment
Clause because "schools seeking reimbursement must maintain accounting procedures that require the State to establish the cost of the secular as
34
distinguished from the religious instruction." The Court then warned of
the dangers of providing state financial aid directly to a church-related
school citing Walz v. Tax Commission 35 for the proposition that
"[ o ]bviously, a direct money subsidy would be a relationship pregnant
with involvement and, as with most government grant programs, could
encompass sustained and detailed administrative relationships for en36
forcement of statutory or administrative standards .... "
According to the Court, the history of government grants reveals that
they typically result in various measures of government control and oversight.37 The Court further notes that the state's power to audit, inspect,
and evaluate a church-related school's expenditures creates an intimate
38
and continuing relationship between church and state. The Pennsylvania arrangement violated the First Amendment because the intent of
the Establishment Clause is to protect religion from government interfer39
ence or supervision. Direct payments and state supervision would certainly violate Mr. Madison's expressed "purity" view of the proper relationship between church-related schools and the state.
In Committee for Public Education & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 40
the Supreme Court dealt with a program that provided direct money
grants to certain nonpublic schools for repair and maintenance, reim-

30.
3 I.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

!d. at 612-13.
See id. at 607-08.
See id.
!d. at 621.
!d. at 620.
Lemon, 403 U.S. at 620 (citing Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970)).
!d. at 621.
See id.
See id. at 622-23.
See id. at 623.
413 U.S. 756 (1973).
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bursed low-income parents for a portion of the cost of private school tuition, including sectarian school tuition, and granted other parents certain
tax benefits. 41 The Court decided that the maintenance and repair provisions of the New York statute violated the Establishment Clause because
its effect was to subsidize and advance the religious mission of sectarian
schools. 42 The Court also held that the tuition reimbursement plans, if
given directly to sectarian schools, would similarly violate the Establishment Clause. 43 Notwithstanding the fact that the grants were delivered to the parents rather than the schools, the effect of the aid was unmistakably to provide financial support for non-public sectarian
institutions. 44
The Nyquist holding concerning payments to parents was substan45
tially weakened with respect to vouchers by Agostini v. Felton. In Agostini the Court stated, "[ w]e have departed from the rule ... that all
government aid that directly assists the educational function of religious
schools is invalid." 46 The Court rejected the argument that government
and religion are too closely linked merely because a school voucher program transfers money from the government to sectarian schools. The
Court noted that "we reject the argument, primarily because funds cannot
reach a sectarian school unless the parents or student decide independently of the government, to send their child to a sectarian school." 47 Consequently, Agostini supports the proposition that when parents or students choose to use funds provided to them by the state to attend a
church-related school, the Establishment Clause is not offended. This is
constitutionally valid because the state funds are paid directly to the student or parent rather than to the church-related school. As such, the State
has no right to compel the church-related school to perform administrative tasks or submit to an audit. This benefit to the parent approach,
which allows a tax deduction for parents for certain educational expenses
whether they were incurred in private, church-related or public schools,
is also seen in Mueller v. Allen. 48 It appears, however, that the decision
left the Nyquist prohibition of aid paid "directly" to a church-related
school unaffected.

4!. See id. at 762-66.
42. See id. at 774-80.
43. See id. at 780-89.
44. See id. at 781.
45. 521 U.S. 203 (1997).
46. !d. at 225.
47. !d. at 230.
48. 463 U.S. 388 (1983). The Court stressed that all the decisions invalidating aid to parochial schools have involved direct transmission of assistance from the states to the schools themselves. See id. at 399.
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In School District of Grand Rapids v. Ball, the Supreme Court dealt
with a school district that adopted a shared time and community education program with nonpublic schools. The program was conducted for
nonpublic school children at state expense in classrooms located in and
leased from private schools. 50 The program offered state-funded classes
during the regular school day that were intended to supplement, for the
private school students, the "core curriculum" courses required by the
51
state. The shared time teachers were full-time employees of public
52
schools. Of the forty-one private schools involved in the program, forty
53
were church-related schools. The Court decided that this initiative had
the "primary or principal effect" of the advancement of religion, and,
54
therefore, violated the Establishment Clause. According to the Court
"even the praiseworthy, secular purpose [of providing for the education
of school children] cannot validate government aid to parochial schools
when the aid has the effect of promoting a single religion or religion
generally or when the aid unduly entangles the government in matters
55
religious." The Court held that "[t]he symbolic union of church and
state inherent in the provision of secular, state-provided instruction in the
religious school buildings threatens to convey a message of state support
56
for religion to students and to the general public." Furthermore, "the
programs in effect subsidize the religious functions of the parochial
schools by taking over a substantial portion of their responsibility .... " 57
Perhaps the most instructive case for our purposes is Witters v.
Washington Department of Services for the Blind. 58 In Witters, the Court
ruled on an objection to the State of Washington's vocational rehabilitation program for the visually handicapped that financed petitioner's
training at a Christian college. 59 The record showed that assistance was
provided under a Washington State program that paid money directly to
the student, who then transmitted it to the educational institution of his
60
choice. The Washington statute authorized the state to '"[p]rovide for

49. 473 U.S. 373 (1984).
50. See id.
51. /d. at 375.
52. See id. at 376.
53. See id. at 379.
54. /d. at 397.
55. Ball, 473 U.S. at 382.
56. /d. at 397.
57. !d. The Court also said that the Establishment Clause "rests on the belief a union of government and religion tends to destroy government and degrade religion." 473 U.S. at 398. (citing
Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421,431 (1962)).
58. 474 U.S. 481 (1986).
59. See id.
60. See id. at 483.
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special education and/or training in the professions, business or trades'
so as to 'assist visually handicapped persons to overcome vocational
handicaps and to obtain the maximum degree of self-support and selfcare. "' 61 Witters, who suffered from a progressive eye disease, was eligible for vocational rehabilitation assistance under the terms of the statute.
He chose to attend Inland Empire School of the Bible, a private Christian
College in Spokane, Washington. 62 He was "studying the Bible, ethics,
speech, and church administration in order to equip himself for a career
as a pastor, missionary or youth director." 63
The Washington court ruled that the "principal or primary effect" of
the state financial assistance to Witters was to train him to become a pastor, missionary, or church youth director. 64 In the view of the Washington court, the state aid clearly had the primary effect of advancing relig65
ion and violated the Establishment Clause. On appeal, the United States
Supreme Court reversed this lower court decision. The Supreme Court
said,
[i]t is well settled that the Establishment Clause is not violated every
time money previously in the possession of a State is conveyed to a religious institution. For example, a State may issue a paycheck to one of
its employees, who may then donate all or part of that paycheck to a religious institution, all without constitutional barrier; and the State may
do so even knowing that the employee so intends to dispose of his sal66
ary.

The Court continued, "[i]t is equally well settled, on the other hand,
that the State may not grant aid to a religious school, whether cash or in
kind, where the effect of the aid is 'that of a direct subsidy to the religious school' from the State." 67 The issue "is whether, on the facts ...
the extension of aid to petitioner and the use of that aid by petitioner to
support religious education is a permissible transfer similar to the hypothetical salary donation described above, or is an impermissible 'direct
'd y. ,,68

SU b Sl

The facts central to the inquiry in the Witters case were whether ( 1)
"any aid provided under Washington's program that ultimately flows to
religious institutions does so only as a result of the genuinely independ-

61. !d. at 483 (quoting WASH. REV. CODE§ 74.18.130 (1981)).
62. See id.
63. !d. at 483.
64. Willers, 474 U.S. at 485 (citing Witters v. Comm'n for the Blind, 689 P.2d 53, 56 (1984).
65. See id.
66. /d. at 486-87.
67. /d. at 487 (quoting Grand Rapids School Dist. v. Ball, 475 U.S. 373, 394 (1985)).
68.

!d. (emphasis added).
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ent private choices of aid recipients" ; (2) "[i]t is not one of the 'ingenious plans for channeling state aid to sectarian schools that periodically
70
reach this court;'" (3) "it creates no financial incentive for students to
71
undertake sectarian education;" (4) "[i]t does not tend to provide
greater or broader benefits for recipients who apply their aid to religious
education;"72 and (5) "[i]n this case, the fact that aid goes to individuals
means that the decision to support religious education is made by the in73
dividual, not by the State."
Importantly, nothing in the record indicated that, if Witter's petition
succeeded, any significant portion of the aid spent on the Washington
74
program as a whole would end up flowing to religious education. The
Court stated that the respondent was "correct in pointing out that aid to a
religious institution, unrestricted in its potential usage, if properly attributable to the state, is clearly prohibited under the Establishment
Clause." 75 But the respondent's argument did not apply in this case because there was no direct aid to the religious school. 76 The Court decided
that, on the facts presented, the Washington program did not constitute
sufficiently direct support of religion so as to violate the Establishment
Clause. 77 Justice Powell, concurring, said that the Washington scheme
was constitutionally permitted because the student or parent directly re. d thestate payments. 78
ce1ve
Before turning to the Arkansas Scholarship program it would help to
review the common threads that bind these cases together. First, requiring church-related schools to maintain administrative and accounting
procedures for review by the state offends the Establishment Clause. 79
Second, payment of financial aid directly to a church-related school of80
fends the Establishment Clause. Third, when there is a disparity in the
amount of state funds spent on public and church-related students the es69. ld. at 487.
70. Witters, 474 U.S. at 488 (citing Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 785).
71. Witters, 474 U.S. at 488.
72. !d.
73. !d.
74. See id.
75. !d. at 489 (citing Grand Rapids, 475 U.S. at 395).
76. See id.
77. See Witters, 474 U.S. at 489.
78. See id. at 491 (Powell, J., concurring) (citing Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 399 ( 1983)
for the proposition that payments directly to parents are constitutional because any benefit to religion
results from "numerous private choices of individual parents of school-age children.").
79. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971 ); Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997).
80. See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 602, Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970); Committee for
P.ub. Educ. and Religious Liberty v. Nyqust, 413 U.S. 756 (1973); Grand Rapids School Dist. v.
Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985); Muller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983); Witters v. Wash. Dept. of Servs.
for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986).
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tablishment clause is offended. 81 Fourth, the Establishment Clause is offended by a program that creates a financial incentive for a student to attend a church-related school. 82 Finally, the Establishment Clause is offended if the government aid is really just an ingenious scheme designed
to channel state aid directly to church-related schools. 83

III. THE PROGRAM AND ITS CONSTITUTIONAL lNFIRMATIES
The Arkansas Governor's Distinguished Scholars Program offends
the Establishment Clause for a wide variety of reasons. First, the program requires church-related institutions to agree to perform administrative tasks and insure compliance with state regulations. The institution
must submit to a review of its records and demonstrate its due diligence
84
as a steward of state funds. One would believe that the administrators
of church schools would object strongly to the grubby hands of state officials thumbing through their private school financial files. It is likely
that these same administrators would object to having a Legislative Audit
review of their books. It is clear that the regulations run afoul of the Establishment Clause holdings under Lemon and Agostini that the state may
not compel religious societies to perform state administrative tasks.
Second, the state funds are paid directly to church-related institutions. This direct aid offends the Establishment Clause under Lemon,
Walz, Nyquist, and Witters. If there is one thing certain under these cases,
the payment of state monies directly to a church-related school is unconstitutional.
Third, there is considerable disparity in the amount of state funds per
scholarship provided to a church-related institutions when compared to
public institutions under the program. Recall that Hendrix will typically
receive $15,000 while Southern Arkansas will receive $4,730 per schol85
arship student. There is also a disparity in the total funds sent to private
and public schools. Church-related schools received $2,182,000 and public institutions $1,334,000 in the years 1998-99. 86 This disparity in treatment of public and church-related institutions also offends the Establishment Clause under Witters. 87
Fourth, the program clearly creates a financial incentive for the Distinguished Scholar to attend a church-related school. This occurs because

81. See Witters, 474 U.S. at 488.
82. /d.
83. See Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973); Witters, 474 U.S. 481 (1986).
84. See DHE, Rule 6(H).
85. ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF HIGHER EDUCATION, supra note 5.
86. See id.
87. See Whitters, 474 U.S. at 488.
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the program is open-ended. The state pays whatever the church-related
institution considers a reasonable level of tuition and fees. 88 The state
sponsored creation of a considerable financial incentive to attend a
church-related school is offensive to the Establishment Clause under Witters.89
Finally, and most controversially, this scholarship program, if newspaper reports are accurate, may be a scheme to channel state aid directly
to church-related schools, a practice that offends the Establishment
90
Clause under Witters. According to Doug Smith, the impetus for the
Distinguished Scholars program did not emanate from the DHE, but
91
rather was proposed by State Senators. The DHE had little choice in
implementation because fifty senators sponsored the enabling legislation.
One of the bill's sponsors is quoted as stating that the bill was brought to
him by the President of the Independent Colleges and Universities Asso92
ciation and by the Association's lobbyist. But the impetus for the program is of questionable relevance because the legislation is so blatantly
unconstitutional. A legal challenge of the program will almost certainly
raise the issue of a scheme to support religious schools. It would be interesting to hear the explanations the Association would offer in support
of having the state rummaging around in its private, church-related educational programs to determine stewardship of state funds.
Mr. Madison would also surely be taken aback. His two veto messages and letter to the Baptist Churches of Neal's Creek and Black
Creek, North Carolina, in 1811, sent a powerful message that government has no business regulating a religious society, giving a religious society legal agency to carry into effect a public duty or giving direct aid to
93
a religious society. The Governor's Distinguished Scholars Scholarship
Program has the unique and dubious distinction of offending all of Madison's notions of separation of religion from influence and regulation by
the government. He believed that the Constitution granted government
no power over religion. And, as in the Arkansas example, when a religious society accepts government funds in this manner the heavy hand of
94
government regulation is sure to follow. It makes no constitutional difference that the church-related schools volunteer for this regulation. This
government regulation offends the Constitution!
88. ARK. CODE ANN.§ 6-82-312(b) (Michie 1998).
89. See Witters, 474 U.S. at 488.

90. See id.
91. See Doug Smith, Pushing and Shoving for the State's Top Scholars, ARKANSAS TIMES,
Aug. 27, 1999, at 13.
92. See id.
93.
94.

See id.
See id.
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As we shall see, this state of affairs is regrettable because there exists
a relatively simple and constitutionally pleasing way to retain Arkansas'
best and brightest students. But before broaching that subject one other
serious problem with the Distinguished Scholarship Program requires
examination.
IV. TITLE VI AND DISPARATE IMPACT
Section 60 I of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act prohibits discrimination "on the ground of race ... under any program or activity receiving
Federal financial assistance." 95 Section 602 of the Act effectuates the
provisions of section 601 to racial, color and national origin discrimination predicated on recipients administering programs and activities. 96 The
U.S. Department of Education, in exercising its authority under section
602, promulgated a regulation which prohibits a funding recipient from
"utiliz[ing] criteria or methods of administration which have the effect of
subjecting individuals to discrimination because of their race, color, or
national origin, or have the effect of defeating or substantially impairing
accomplishment of the objectives of the program as respects individuals
of a particular race, color, or national origin."97 It is undisputed that the
state of Arkansas receives federal funds for numerous educational programs, thereby becoming subject to this regulation. 98
Does this scholarship program have a disparate impact on black students? Only four (0.4%) of the 936 Distinguished Scholar scholarship
recipients are black, while about 16.1% of the state's undergraduate stu99
dents have this background. The sole basis for selection of the scholarship recipients is a score of 32 on the ACT, 1410 on the SAT or being a
finalist in the National Merit Scholarship competition. 100 In Griggs v.
101
Duke Power Co., the Supreme Court introduced the theory of disparate
impact discrimination by holding that a plaintiff need not necessarily
prove intentional discrimination in order to prove that an employer has
violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. Since then, "facially neutral
employment practices that have significant adverse effects on protected
groups have been held to violate the Act without proof ... [of] discrimi102
natory intent." The theory is based on the idea that even unintentional
95. 42 u.s.c. ~ 2000d (1994).
96. 42 u.s.c ~ 2000d-l (1994).
97. 34 C.F.R. ~ 100.3(b)(2)(1999).
98. See id.
99. See ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF HIGHER EDUCATION, supra note 5, tbl. IV.
I 00. See Doug Smith, Pushing and Shoving for the State's Top Scholars, ARKANSAS TIMES,
Aug. 27, 1999, at 13.
101. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
I 02. Watson v. Fort Worth Bank and Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 986-87 (1988).
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discrimination can be "equivalent to intentional discrimination," because
the ultimate outcome is the same. 103 Finally, courts have applied the employment disparate impact theory to cases involving Title VI. 104
To demonstrate a prima facie case of disparate impact discrimination, a plaintiff-student must first show that the selection practice followed has caused a disproportionate effect that excludes him from an
educational opportunity. 105 If such a showing has been made, the burden
shifts to the defendant who must demonstrate that the selection practice
is justified by "educational necessity." 106 However, even if the defendant
meets this burden, the complainant may prevail by offering an effective
alternative practice that results in less disproportionality while still serv107
ing the goals of the educational program. The racially disproportionate
effect is typically demonstrated by the use of statistical evidence comparing the racial composition of the candidates selected compared with the
qualified candidates in the pool. 108 Applying the Title VI criteria to this
case, it is evident that the program would not survive the disparate impact test. Clearly, black students have been disproportionately impacted
by the Distinguished Scholars standards. Only four of the 936 students
selected, or 0.4%, were African-American. 109
The next inquiry is whether the sole standards adopted by the State,
ACT and SAT scores and becoming a National Merit finalist, are justified by "educational necessity." To determine if there is an educational
necessity the inquiry is whether Arkansas has some independent basis for
choosing the cutoff scores. For example, the state might establish a cutoff score by using a professional estimate of the requisite ability levels to
succeed in the scholarship program. 110 However, there is no evidence of
such a professional study. The enabling legislation was presented to the
General Assembly complete and without state agency input. 111 In order
to survive a disparate impact challenge, the state must establish someI 03. /d. at 987.
104. See e.g. Elston v. Talladega County Bd. ofEduc., 997 F.2d 1394, 1407 (lith Cir. 1993);
Powell v. Ridge, 189 F.3d 387, 391 (3d Cir. 1999) (holding that a disparate impact claim against the
Pennsylvania school funding formula could proceed under Title VO.
105. See Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642,656-57 (1989).
106. Board of Educ. of the City School Dist. of New York v. Harris, 444 U.S. 130, 151
(1979).
107. See Watson, 487 U.S. at 998.
108. See Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 650-55.
I 09. But would these disparate impact numbers justify a private cause of action under Title
VI? The answer, apparently, is yes. See Powell v. Ridge, 189 F.3d 387 (3d Cir. 1999) (holding that a
private cause of action exists to determine whether the funding of Pennsylvania schools has a disparate impact on black students); Ring v. First Interstate Mortgage, Inc., 984 F.2d 924, 926 (8th
Cir.l993).
110. See Watson, 487 U.S. at 994-95.
Ill. See Smith, supra note 2 (concerning the drafting of the legislation).
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thing more than a mere articulation of the basis - in this instance, to keep
112
good students in Arkansas - for the cutoff score. Recently the U.S.
Department of Education proposed regulations that provide:
The use of any educational test which has [a] significant disparate impact on members of any particular race ... is discriminatory, and a violation of Title VI and/or Title IX respectively, unless ... there is no
practical alternative form of assessment which meets the educational
113
institution's needs and would have a less disparate impact.

Moreover, a recent district court decision found that NCAA initial
eligibility rules (Proposition 16) that solely utilized a minimum test score
on the ACT or SAT for eligibility to play constituted a disparate impact
114
on African-American student-athletes.
Although reversed on other
grounds, Cureton v. NCAA is instructive because the NCAA rule is remarkably similar to the Arkansas scholarship program in its operation
and impact. The NCAA's justification for its policy was to increase the
graduation rate for black student-athletes and to close the gap between
115
white and black athlete graduation rates. But, alas for the NCAA, the
court found that African-American athletes were already graduating at a
116
greater rate than black students generally.
The practical effect of
Proposition 16 was to restrict the access of black athletes to the limited
number of college athletic scholarships available. 117 The court questioned
whether this would decrease the graduation gap. According to the judge,
proffering such a "back-end" (later graduation) balancing between
graduation rates and entrance requirements violates the prohibition
against using a "bottom line" (the blacks we accepted did well) defense
against disparate impact in cases involving pass/fail selection procedures
like those found in Connecticut v. Tea/. 118
An even stronger argument that a private cause of action exists
against the state because of disparate impact is found in a Pennsylvania
school funding case. The Third Circuit, in Powell v. Ridge, decided that
112. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 6-82-30 I (Michie 1998) (stating the purpose of the legislation).
113. Walter Williams. Killing The Messenger, ARKANSAS DEMOCRAT GAZETTE, Sept.!, 1999,
BIO.
114. See Cureton v. NCAA, 37 F.Supp.2d 687 (E.D. Pa.l999), rev'd on other grounds, No.
99-1222, (3'" Cir. Dec. 22, 1999) (providing a roadmap of how courts might treat the Arkansas allegations. The Appeals Court reversed on the basis that the NCAA was not subject to the Title VI
regulations because it does not directly receive federal funds and is not a program or activity covered
by Title VI, citing NCAA v. Smith, 525 U.S. 459 (1999), that determined that the mere fact that the
NCAA received funds from members that received federal financial assistance did not subject the
NCAA to coverage under Title IX. The Court took great care to state that it did not reach the question of whether Proposition 16 created a disparate impact on a protected class under Title VI.).
115. See Cureton, 37 F.Supp.2d at 699.
116. See id. at 712.
117. See id. at 699.
118. See id. at 700 (citing Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 446 (1982)).
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in order to go to trial, all the plaintiff must do is plead that a facially neutral practice's adverse effects fall disproportionately on a group protected
by Title VI and the implementing section 602. 119
The final inquiry in a disparate impact case is whether there are other
effective alternative means. To state it another way, one would ask if
there are no other practical tests that have a less disparate impact that
could be adopted that will achieve Arkansas' goal of retaining the state's
best and brightest students. There is a recent Equal Protection case that is
helpful in identifying other relevant factors that might be considered. In
120
Hopwood v. Texas, the court decided it was a violation of the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to take into account
solely a person's race when making admission decisions. 121 The court
said, however, that race may be considered along with a number of other
factors such as playing the cello, making a downfield tackle, understanding Chaos Theory, economic status, life experience, family educational
background, whether parents are alumni, how fast a person can run,
marital status, disability status, ACT and SAT scores, and veteran's
status. 122 Why not consider some of those other relevant factors as qualification standards for the Distinguished Scholars Program?
V. THECURE

It is quite easy for pointy-headed professors to criticize administrative policy. Of greater interest, perhaps, is how the state can accomplish
its stated goal of retaining more of its best and brightest high school
graduates. This article suggests three possible modifications to the program. First, the "direct aid" issue can be avoided by making payments
directly to the graduating senior or his parents rather than directly to the
schools. By doing this state funds would be expended based on the free
choice of the student or parent. It would be the recipients' obligation to
assure the state that the funds are being properly used and that the recipi119. See Powell v. Ridge, 189 F.3d 387, 393 (3d Cir. 1999) (The plaintiffs alleged that the
school funding formulas had a disparate impact on the Philadelphia School District that had a 7780% minority student body. The court cited Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n of New York,
463 U.S. at 582, 607 n.27 (1983), for the proposition that administrative regulations incorporating a
disparate impact standard (like section 602) are valid.).
120. 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996).
121. See id. at 935.
122. See id. at 946. This approach is adopted by The Law School Admission Council. In its
new publication, NEW MODELS TO ASSURE DIVERSITY, FAIRNESS, AND APPROPRIATE TEST USE IN
LAW SCHOOL ADMISSIONS 14-15 (Oct. 1999), the Council recommends several other criteria that
schools might employ in addition to SAT/ACT scores. They are other academic factors, demographic and diversity factors, leadership and extracurricular factors, life accomplishments, character
and fitness, personal qualities, and skills and abilities. The Council cites Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F. 3d
932 (5th Cir. 1996), and Wessmann v. Gittens, 160 F.3d 790 (1" Cir. 1998), as major cases that require consideration of several factors in the admissions process.
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ent is meeting the required hours and grade point standards.
Second, each recipient could be given the same dollar amount of
educational subsidy. Assume every award is $12,000. The recipient
would be free to use these dollars to attend the institution of his choice. If
80% of the students decide to attend church-related schools, this would
be constitutionally acceptable because it is their individual choice. If a
recipient attends a public institution that costs $8,000 per year, that
would also be acceptable as that is their individual choice. 123
Third, the DHE can easily draft regulations to comply with Title VI
by listing relevant factors other than ACT and SAT scores to be taken
into account when awarding the scholarships. Hopwood and the new
Law School Admission Council Models tell us that a wide variety of factors such as athletic ability, economic status, military service, geographic
residence, leadership ability, parental education level, foreign travel,
family language, race/ethnicity, artistic ability, and other relevant life experiences can be taken into account. Considering these factors will typically allow for inclusion of disadvantaged members of society in the Arkansas program that are currently excluded by reliance solely on the
applicants' SAT/ACT scores.
VI. CONCLUSION
By implementing these three simple corrections, the Arkansas Governor's Distinguished Scholars Program would be brought into legal and
constitutional compliance. These proposals would cure the infirmities of
the scholarship program by achieving the intent of the program without
offending the Constitution or Title VI.

123. As noted in the example provided, there may be instances where monies granted exceed
the amount necessary for tuition and fees. This could be remedied by the State insisting that any
monies granted over and above tuition be spent for educational purposes and materials such as a
computer, books, etc.

